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CRITICAL ESSAY 
 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW:  




During a completely random search on the web, I unexpectedly came across 
David H. Lempert's, “A Treatise on International Development Law,” (the 
“Work”). 1  The first item that caught my eye was the Abstract of the Work 
declaring that, “[t]his article presents an overview of the first legal treatise on 
international development law. . .”  As this was an article published in a law 
school journal, it ran contrary to the accepted legal definitions of what constitutes 
a “treatise.”  Namely, that, “legal treatises are single or multi-volume works 
dedicated to the examination of an area of law. . . Treatises tend to provide an in-
depth discussion of a particular area of law and will provide the researcher with 
references to a few cases and statutes.” In contrast, “[a]rticles in academic journals 
tend to revolve around very theoretical and cutting-edge legal issues. Articles in 
practitioner-oriented journals tend to be more practical.”2 
It further struck me that claiming to be the “first” exposition in any field, but 
perhaps particularly in law, appears to be overreaching.  It is rare that any legal 
topic has never been considered by anyone before.  Indeed, in my own academic 
writing, I leave it to other commentators and peer reviewers to proclaim whether a 
stated idea or conclusion of mine is actually the “first” of its kind.3  In fact, 
 
* Ms. Rumu Sarkar is the General Counsel of Millennium Partners, an international development 
consulting firm, and formerly an Adjunct Law Professor at the Georgetown University Law 
Center.  She is currently an Assistant Professor at the Uniformed Services University of the Health 
Sciences, Global Health Distance Learning Program, School of Medicine, located in Bethesda MD.  
A select portion of this analysis have been previously published in Rumu Sarkar, 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: Rule of Law, Human Rights & Global Finance (2d ed., 
Springer) (2020), see Addendum, “What the Text Is And What It Is Not,” infra. 
1 David Lempert, A Treatise on International Development Law, 11 DePaul J. for Soc. Just., Art. 
6 (2018). 
2 “Secondary Sources: ‘Treaties,’ and ‘Legal Periodicals,’” Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman 
Law Library, available at https://library.law.yale.edu/secondary-sources.  See also “Secondary 
Sources: ALRs, Encyclopedias, Law Reviews, Restatements, & Treatises, Intro to Treatises,” that 
states that, “Treatises . . . are book-length expositions on the law as it pertains to a particular 
subject. . . . A legal treatise maybe a short, single volume or a large, multi volume set.” Harvard 
law School Law Library, Secondary Sources, available at 
https://guides.library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=309942&p=2070277 (last updated July 24, 2020). 
3 Indeed, in my own experience in being peer reviewed (by law professors, not law students) for a 
legal text that I wrote, it was an (anonymous) peer reviewer that speculated that my writing was 
one of very few (if not the only one) to attempt a definition/articulation of the field of 
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Lempert also seems to be almost entirely self-referential since he quotes his own 
works in 60 out of the 96 footnotes in his article!   
I further noted that in order to distinguish his Work from my own pre-existing 
volumes on the same subject-matter, Lempert states rather emphatically that: 
 
Although one textbook appeared in 2009 with a title suggesting that 
it was a treatise on international development law, the actual focus 
and list of topics in the book helps explain what has really been 
happening in the field that has replaced and diverted attention from 
international development law. Rumu Sarkar’s International 
Development Law: Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Global Finance 
is really a treatise on foreign investment law.* [fn. *18]  As 
“development” itself has been redefined in the past several years to 
promote globalization and neocolonialism rather than the principles 
of development that are established under international law, so too 
has development law come to be reinvented as international 
investment and finance law under a new name. Indeed, Sarkar’s 
book is really about international investment law, with “history and 
theory” in Part I serving as a springboard for focusing on the law of 
global financial systems.  (Footnotes deleted.)4 
 
He footnotes his text above by inserting footnote 18 that further declares:  
 
See RUMU SARKAR, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: 
RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL FINANCE, xi 
(Oxford U. Press 2009).  According to Sarkar’s capsule autobiography, 
Rumu Sarkar taught a course in Development Law and International 
Finance at Georgetown University Law Center. In addition, Sarkar 
published this book with a title that defines development law as “a new 
field of legal studies” that is essentially an arm of foreign investment. 
Her book is based on an earlier study founded on economic measures. 
Since 2016, Sarkar is the General Counsel of Millennium Partners: a 
global investment firm that she describes as an “international 
development consulting firm”.5 
 
“international development law.”  The text being peer reviewed was Rumu Sarkar, 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: Rule of Law, Human Rights & Global Finance (2d ed., 
Springer) (2020). 
4 Lempert, supra note 1, at 6. 
5 Id. at n. 18. 
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I must confess that upon reading this, my first response was to laugh.  I 
described this passage to a law school friend and trusted advisor as a joke, but he 
strongly urged me to respond to this Work in kind by publishing my own views on 
it.  He was right.6  Although the cause of my merriment may not be immediately 
obvious to anyone else, the Work is replete with factual errors and material 
misrepresentations with respect not only to my academic publications but also with 
regard to my professional status as a practicing lawyer.  
If left unanswered by me, my silence may be viewed as a ratification of these 
conclusory and false statements, and I most definitely do not concur with them! 
(Indeed, I am aware of the maxim, qui tacet consentire videtur, or "silence 
implies/means consent," and I want to ensure that my failure to respond to these 
false characterizations heretofore is not interpreted as my consent to or agreement 
with what Lempert has published about me and my work.)7 
Thus, it is with the kind permission of the Editorial Board and Staff of this 
distinguished law journal that I have been given leave to express my views here, 
and for which I am deeply grateful.  So, I apologize for the tardiness of my response 
to Lempert’s article, but frankly, I did not actually see it until August 2020. 
 
A. FACTUAL ERRORS AND MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS 
 
At the outset, Lempert states that my own work, INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT LAW: Rule of Law, Human Rights & Global Finance (1st ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009), hereinafter referred to as “IDL 1st ed.”8  “is really a 
treatise on foreign investment law.”9  I find this description to be truly remarkable.  
Law libraries are full of treatises and other secondary materials that discuss the 
subject of international investment law.  Put succinctly, "[i]nternational investment 
law is best described as a field of public international law which deals with the laws 
governing the commercial activities of multinational enterprises that are undertaken 
in foreign states. This occurs when a business or firm decides to open a branch of 
operations overseas, such as a factory or a mine, and in so doing it may come into 
 
6 Zachary Z. Kinney is a Major, US Air Force, Retired; Colonel, DC Defense Force, Retired, and 
the former Chairman of the Criminal Law, Homeland Security and Paralegal Studies Department, 
Everest College, Arlington, Virginia Campus. 
7 See The Law Dictionary, Qui Tacet Consentire Videtur, available at: 
“https://dictionary.thelaw.com/qui-tacet-consentire-videtur/. 
8 The original Oxford text has been updated and published as Rumu Sarkar, INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT LAW: Rule of Law, Human Rights & Global Finance (2d ed., Springer) (2020), 
hereinafter referred to as “IDL 2d ed.”) 
9 Lempert, supra note 1, at 6. 
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conflict with that host state's laws.”10 I cannot imagine a topic farther removed from 
the subject-matter of international development law as set forth in IDL 1st ed.! 
Further, by stating that, “development law [has] come to be reinvented as 
international investment and finance law under a new name,” 11  Lempert 
misconstrues (whether deliberately or not) the actual definition, function, and 
position of IDL within the subject-matter of international law overall. 
In fact, if we consider the subject of “international financial law,” it has been 
precisely defined by the Peace Palace Library as: 
 
International Financial Law is a framework of rules, standards and 
practices that govern international financial markets and transactions. 
The objective of this framework is to create international financial 
stability. This stability has to be created in an environment of 
national jurisdictions, each pursuing their own national interest and 
governance standards, and is constantly threatened by the 
consequences of increasing globalization, technological 
development and financial innovation.12 
 
Once again, this is far removed from the subject-matter of international 
development law as I have defined it in both editions of IDL. 
Indeed, I struggled with naming this new field of legal study as “international 
development law.”  I made this clear in discussing the “so-called “international law 
of development” that underscored UN initiatives such as the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO).”13 I further stated that, “[i]t is with some misgiving that 
I have titled the text, International Development Law, for fear that it would be 
confused with this legal movement associated with the NIEO agenda. I can only 
 
10 David Collins, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017) at 1. It is hardly possible to give a full listing of legal treatises on the same 
subject since there are so many, including, for example, Peter Muchlinski, Frederico Ortino, 
Christoph Schreuer, Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, (Oxford Uni. Press, 2008);  
Rudolf Dolzer, Christoph Schreuer, “Principles of International Investment Law,” (Oxford Uni. 
Press, 2012); Karl Sauvant, “Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy,” (Oxford Uni. 
Press, 2009); Zachary Douglas, ed., et al., “The Foundations of International Investment Law: 
Bringing Theory into Practice,”  (Oxford Uni. Press, 2014). 
11 Lempert, supra note 1, at 6. 
12 Peace Palace Library, International Financial Law: Introduction, available at: 
https://peacepalacelibrary.nl/research-guides/economic-and-financial-law/international-financial-
law/, (last updated June 18, 2019). 
13 Rumu Sarkar, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: Rule of Law, Human Rights and 
Global Finance (Oxford Uni. Press, 2009) hereinafter referred to as “IDL 1st ed.” 
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hope that we are sufficiently past that stage of theory as to not create any 
confusion on this point.”14 
However, I was not able to provide a neatly worded definition of international 
development law in good faith in IDL 1st ed. since I was very cognizant of the fact 
that, as I saw it, the subject was an admixture of law, philosophy, history and 
economics. Thus, the multi-disciplinary aspects of the subject would naturally lead 
to disagreements on how to establish the legitimate parameters of the subject.  
Moreover, the underlying question of what constitutes “development” itself may not 
be agreed upon at the outset!  So, I undertook a three-part analysis, first, in defining 
a nexus with development. To wit, 
 
Distinguishing international development law questions from private 
international law questions may not be easy since implications of 
both may be present in any given fact scenario. The distinction 
between an international legal issue and an international 
development law question may be drawn by asking the following 
question: Does a domestic law question of a developing country 
have a foreseeable impact on the development of that country? For 
example, if a host country wishes to build a seaport in order to 
boost its overall economic development, this does not necessarily 
raise a specific development law question. If, however, a host 
country is building a seaport using project finance that involves 
joint ventures with foreign operators and requires that a new 
foreign investment regime be put in place, then development law 
questions do arise. (Emphasis in original.) 
 
Similarly, the legal issue of whether women should have the right 
to the legal custody of their children following a separation from 
the marital domicile may pose a family law issue under domestic 
law, or an international human rights question, or, if legal reform of 
existing family law is contemplated in order to change the legal 
status of women, a development law question.15 
 
The excerpt above sets forth my thinking on how to define an “international 
development law” question.  Both the definition and the subject-matter itself is 
simply not related to (or a substitute for) international investment law or 
 
14 Id. at 55, n. 68. 
15 IDL 1st ed., supra note 13, at 79; see also, IDL 2d ed., supra note 8, at xi-xii where the same 
analysis was carried forth. 
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international financial law as those fields are currently, and historically have, been 
treated by established legal scholars.  
Second, by recognizing that international development law is a subset of 
international law, I established a legitimate place for it within the “taxonomy” of 
law.  Third, I further argued that international development law itself establishes an 
overarching rubric under which many other law subjects may be classified, such as 
investment law, banking law, women’s rights, environmental law, trade law, etc. if 
these subjects actually address the development process.16 Thus, Lempert has it 
backwards: international development law (IDL) is not “foreign investment law” 
but rather “foreign investment law” is a subset of IDL insofar as it may specifically 
deal with development law questions!  
Lempert also argues that I was actually writing on “international investment law, 
with ‘history and theory’ in Part I serving as a springboard for focusing on the law 
of global financial systems.” 17   This is a completely misplaced and untrue 
characterization of my work that actually reveals his superficial and slipshod 
reading of IDL 1st edition.   
The first part of both works, IDL 1st and 2d editions, sets the foundation for the 
entire subject, and upon which the second part is built.  This follows the accepted 
and widely used approach of teaching legal subjects by first establishing the context 
of the law by examining its historical roots, legislative history and case law history, 
if applicable. To simply discuss the principles and legal framework of IDL, 
especially as “an emerging legal discipline” as I put it, without any context of any 
kind erodes its credibility as a legitimate subject of law.  (In fact, this is exactly 
what Lempert attempts to do in his Work, and the lack of context, I would argue, 
undercuts his attempt.) 
Accordingly, both editions of IDL are divided into two major parts: the first part 
dealing with the history, the theoretical and substantive principles, and whether 
there is a human right to development.  The second part sets forth the international 
financial architecture with specific discussions on sovereign debt, privatization, 
emerging capital markets, and corruption. (NB. The new chapter on “Corruption 
and Its Consequences,” is only found in IDL 2d ed.)  The first part is not a 
“springboard” for the second, but a “foundation” for it: the two parts are distinct but 
interlinked.   
Moreover, writing about the international financial architecture that supports 
development was a conscious choice for me.  In other words, I made the issues 
surrounding the financing of development as the starting point for IDL. The specific 
projects and development-related undertakings in, for example, infrastructure, 
 
16 See e.g., IDL 2d ed,. supra note 8, at xii;  See also IDL 1st ed., supra note 13, at 77. 
17 Lembert, supra note 1, at 6. 
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health, climate change, habitat protection, women’s empowerment etc., all need to 
be financed before they may be successfully achieved.  Further, in laying out this 
road map for IDL, I classified these and other subjects as falling under the rubric of 
IDL generally insofar as they may relate to development efforts.  
Additionally, Lempert in his footnote about me goes on to argue that, “Sarkar 
published this book [IDL 1st ed.] with a title that defines development law as “a new 
field of legal studies” that is essentially an arm of foreign investment. Her book is 
based on an earlier study founded on economic measures.”18 At the outset, I defined 
IDL as “an emerging legal discipline,”19 and never characterized it as “an arm of 
foreign investment.” Sadly, I have no idea what he means by “an earlier study 
founded on economic measures.” 
In the same footnote, Lempert baldly asserts that, “[s]ince 2016, Sarkar is the 
General Counsel of Millennium Partners: a global investment firm that she 
describes as an “international development consulting firm.”20  I find this statement 
to be completely incomprehensible.  First, I have been the General Counsel of 
Millennium Partners since 2013, not 2016, and it is an international development 
consulting firm!21 To suggest otherwise is to imply that I don’t even know what the 
firm, whom I represent, does in course of its own business.  
Moreover, I am at a loss in terms of what motivates Lempert’s invective against 
me since I have had no direct or indirect personal contact with him, or through 
anyone else.  My only guess is that his mischaracterization of Millennium Partners, 
and my role in it, serves his underlying purpose of casting both my academic and 
professional careers as exclusively dedicated to “international finance” in complete 
disregard for what my professional and academic careers actually have been.  
Perhaps Lempert’s motive in publishing deliberately misleading characterizations 
about my work is to establish himself as the true founder of IDL.  If this is the case, 
it is a sad commentary on his own lack of professionalism and integrity. 
During the course of my academic career as a law professor, I must have read 
hundreds of law review articles, and I have published well over a dozen of my own.  
But I do not recall reading a critique of someone’s work that was laced with such 
factual inaccuracies that encompass not only the academic work itself but also the 
professional career of the legal author! Lempert’s outrageous statements concerning 
me and my published works are mean-spirited as well as being academically 
unfounded and dishonest.  Thus, I feel that it is incumbent on me to explain my own 
 
18 Id. at n. 18. 
19 IDL 1st ed., supra note 13, at Preface at unnumbered first page. 
20 Lempert, supra note 1, at 6 n.18. 
21 See the website of Millennium Partners, available at: http://www.millenniumpartners.org/news/ 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2020).  The site clearly states that I joined the firm as General Counsel in 
November 2013, and the projects described therein are all Rule of Law reform projects. 
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pathway to creating IDL (although I had no prior intention of doing so) in light of 
the fact that Lempert has called it into question. 
 
B.    THE GENESIS AND THE TRAJECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT LAW 
 
As a final matter, Lempert takes issue, apparently, with my position as a former 
adjunct law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, stating that, 
“[a]ccording to Sarkar’s capsule autobiography, Rumu Sarkar taught a course in 
Development Law and International Finance at Georgetown University Law 
Center.”22  This is only partially true and thus, is also factually misleading by its 
omissions. 
When I began teaching at Georgetown Law, the LL.M. course was called, “Law 
and Development.” Along with other Georgetown law professors who taught the 
same seminar at different times, we all relied on miscellaneous law reviews, 
newspaper articles and the like. After teaching the subject for the first two years, I 
began to become totally dissatisfied with this approach.  Even though I laid out 
certain organizing principles of “Law and Development,” it evaporated the moment 
the course was finished.   
Perhaps out of sheer naiveté, I undertook the task of writing a textbook on the 
subject.  After all, most law classes revolve around a text or case book of some kind.  
While certain courses I took while a law student did have a binder of opinions and 
other academic materials that were specifically collated by the law professor, this 
was the exception rather than the rule. 
Thus, writing a text on IDL was informed both by my teaching at Georgetown 
Law as well as my work in the field since at the time, I was an attorney with the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). My professional experience stemmed from working on USAID's 
development portfolio, and traveling to its many offices in, for example, Albania, 
Burundi, El Salvador, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Yemen, Zambia.  (Believe 
me, this is hardly a complete list of my travels!)  
These experiences were a complete immersion on how development projects are 
conceived and implemented as well as an introduction to the many, complex legal 
issues surrounding these undertakings.  It was quite an experience, and it enabled 
me to move seamlessly between theory and practice.  The fact that my field work 
fully informed my academic writing gave me tremendous satisfaction, and I 
sincerely hope that my Georgetown law students benefited from this perspective as 
well. 
 
22 Lempert, supra note 1, at 6 n.18. 
8
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol14/iss1/6
 
In retrospect, I must say that Georgetown Law was very supportive of me since 
I kept changing the title of the LL.M. course as my thinking, research and 
publishing progressed. In fact, I was never particularly fond of the “Law and 
Development” title, and stated that:  
 
This chapter outlines the contours of [international] development 
law as a new legal discipline. A transition to this new discipline, 
however, requires a movement away from the terminology of “law 
and development.” As the scholarly literature on the subject 
definitively concludes, the law and development movement, its 
intellectual adherents, and its viability as a legal doctrine have long 
been defunct. (Footnote eliminated.) 
 
It would be a critical intellectual and pragmatic error to remain 
wedded to this terminology or the intellectual underpinnings of the 
law and development approach to legal systems development. 
Moreover, there is an implicit stigma attached to legal disciplines 
that are described in a conjunctive fashion such as “law and 
development” or “law and literature” or “law and the rights of 
women.” International development law has moved past the 
conjunctive stage and has come of age.23 
 
In looking through my class lecture outlines for the Georgetown Law’s LL.M. 
seminar in preparing this article, I note that it went from “Law and Development” to 
“Development Law and Finance,” to “Development Law,” to “International 
Development Law.” So, while Lempert’s description of my teaching a course in 
Development Law and International Finance at Georgetown University Law Center 
is correct, it is incomplete. Moreover, the title itself should have been a clue to him 
of something much larger: My publication of DEVELOPMENT LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE.24 
So, while Lempert may believe that IDL 1st edition was my first exposition on 
the subject, it was actually my third! I changed the title when I changed my 
publisher, and it was also a reflection of my maturing ideas on the subject.  Indeed, 
the importance of the very first edition of the work cannot be underestimated, at 
least in my own mind. 
 
23 IDL 1st ed., supra note 13, at 75. 
24 Rumu Sarkar, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (Kluwer Law Int’l, 
1st ed., 1999, 2d ed., 2002).  These texts were the author’s first two expositions on the subject 
before publishing IDL 1st ed. with Oxford University Press (2009). 
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I actually went to the home office of my now late law professor, Sir Elihu 
Lauterpacht, CBE QC LLD, in his Cambridge, UK home to request him to write the 
foreword to this work.  (I had taken his public international law course as part of my 
LL.M. studies at Cambridge University, and he gave me a “first” for my final 
examination in his course.) He readily agreed to provide the foreword, and then got 
out of his chair and pulled down a volume from his extensive law library and began 
rifling through the pages.  “Rumu,” he said quietly, “under the rules of Cambridge 
University, you may submit this work as a Ph.D. thesis.”  
I was stunned at this possibility, but I did submit the work before I left 
Cambridge, but didn’t hear anything for about six months.  Thinking it was a 
missed opportunity, I dismissed it until I received an email inviting me to do my 
viva (oral dissertation) at Trinity College.25 After a harrowing two hours of an 
examination by two law professors, I was later informed weeks later that I had 
passed, and a few months later, received my Ph.D. in Philosophy! 
Some time later, I happened to attend a seminar on theories in law that was 
hosted by Georgetown Law, and made the acquaintance of Professor (and later 
Vice-Dean) Yansheng Zhu who was completing his Fulbright Scholarship at 
Georgetown Law.  He was already familiar with my work on international 
development law to my surprise.  He invited me to speak at his law school, the 
Xiamen School of Law in Xiamen, China.  To my further surprise, he specifically 
asked to me to lecture on “whether there was a human right to development.”  The 
only caveat, he said, was for me to obtain a Fulbright Scholarship in order to 
support my trip. 
I was somewhat taken aback by his request, but did, in fact, obtain a Fulbright 
Scholarship.  However, while I did lecture at Xiamen and was very generously 
hosted by Professor Yansheng and Professor Huiping Chen, I was not able to use 
my Fulbright grant in time.  
Instead, I was invited to speak at the John Paul II School of Law in Lublin, 
Poland, thanks to the gracious invitation of Father (Professor) Włodzimierz Bronski. 
I taught a two-week advanced seminar on “Global Finance & International 
Financial Crimes.” My 80+ graduate law students spoke English as a second or 
perhaps third language but, regrettably, I could not speak a word of Polish.  Despite 
this, I was amazed at the reception I received, especially a standing ovation and two 
bouquets of flowers from my students at the conclusion of the course!  
This Fulbright experience, in turn, later led to a fortuitous meeting with another 
Fulbrighter who introduced me to Air Force Colonel Brad Boetig who directs the 
 
25 N.B. Sir Eli was a Fellow of Trinity College and an Honorary Professor of International Law.  I 
matriculated from Newnham College, Cambridge University, and received a Masters of Law 
(LL.M.), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy. 
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Global Health Distance Learning Program at the Uniformed Services University, F. 
Edward Hébert School of Medicine in Bethesda, MD. After two years of teaching 
there, I am now an Assistant Professor teaching principally in the Global Health 
and Development course. I certainly never expected to be teaching intentional 
development law to medical students and global health specialists! It is, and 
continues to be, a wonderful teaching and learning experience for me.  
In addition, the acceptance by other law professors and academics of the full 
text of IDL1st edition became clear to me when I was invited by Professor James 
Fry26 to be a guest lecturer at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.  To my 
surprise, he used the entire text of IDL 1st edition for his seminar on “Law and 
Development.”  
To cite another example, I was very humbled in coming across a book review of 
IDL 1st edition posted on the University of Toronto Law Library that stated, “I 
would recommend this book for any academic or firm library, definitely, as an 
academic treatise as well as a helpful guide for practicing attorneys in international 
development law. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature on a 
developing area of international law. Sarkar's work is thoughtful and well 
researched; it largely achieves the goal of bringing cohesion to a largely scattered 
topic.”27  (Emphasis supplied.)  Therefore, for Lempert to suggest that IDL 1st 
edition is not a “treatise” or that it does not deal with international development 
issues generally but with international finance issues only, cannot be supported. 
The last time I visited Cambridge was to attend Sir Eli’s memorial service in 
2017. It was a very sad occasion for all of us who knew, respected and admired him.  
His devotion to his students, and theirs for him, was legendary. His impact on 
 
26 Professor James Fry is an Associate Professor of Law and Director of the LLM Program at the 
University of Hong Kong. At the time of his invitation to me, he was a Visiting Professor at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, teaching a law seminar entitled, “Law and Development.” 
27 Book review of INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW (1st ed.) (Oxford Uni. Press, 
2009), available at: https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?7065169&uuid=2fa2ebb2-a399-4d79-
b030-e30e1701f295 (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). The review further states, in part: 
 
In this path-breaking work, Professor Rumu Sarkar expertly combines law, philosophy, political 
theory, and economic analysis with real world experience to establish for the first time a 
comprehensive foundation of substantive law principles of international development law. This 
meticulously documented work is sure to be the touchstone for all future writing in a subject area 
that is quickly emerging as one of the most important in international law…Rumu Sarkar's new 
book comes as a most welcome decisive step forward. Making full use of her acute intelligence 
and multiple fields of expertise, and writing with the moral passion of one who cares personally 
for those whom development at its best is meant to benefit, Sarkar works just that synthesis which 
international development law, as a simultaneously academic and practical discipline fraught with 
ethical importance, has been so long awaiting. Id. 
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public international law questions as a barrister and as a distinguished law professor 
is also truly legendary. 
It was in 2019 that I discovered something quite unexpected.  Sir Eli had 
donated his massive collection of his personal law books to Gray’s Inn, London, 
where he had done his clerkship to become a barrister.  It is now known as the 
“Lauterpacht Collection.” To my complete astonishment, Sir Eli had included two 
of my legal works!   
He did not, however, donate my works that he had written a foreword to, 
namely all four editions of the IDL collection.  The Librarian of Gray’s Inn has 
graciously accepted my personal donation of those works simply because they have 
Sir Eli’s foreword in all of them, including the last, IDL 2d edition, which was 
published after Eli had passed away. I preserved his foreword in memorium because 
his teaching and support for my own academic endeavors were so deeply 
meaningful to me.  My journey in creating International Development Law as a new 
legal discipline has been a deeply moving journey for me, both academically and 
personally. 
So, I would have welcomed a disciplined and respectful dialogue with Lempert 
regardless of whether he agreed or disagreed with my theories, approaches, research 
or writing.  Instead, I was met with a side swipe that deliberately misstates facts and 
creates misleading impressions about my publications and professional career. 
 
C. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
It is not my intent here to critique Lempert’s Work.  I will leave it to his readers to 
judge its authenticity and value.  However, I will say that even a superficial perusal 
of his Work reveals the shaky foundation upon which it is laid.  He describes his 
“methodology for extracting the basic principles from the body of treaties is one 
regularly used by lawyers and judges when trying to find the precepts underlying 
laws and is referred to as statutory analysis.”28  However, statutory analysis is the 
interpretation applied to statutes, not treaties.  Indeed, it is axiomatic that treaties 
are not statutes.  Simply put:  
 
At a general level, a self-executing treaty may be defined as a treaty that 
may be enforced in the courts without prior legislation by Congress, and 
 
28 Lempert, supra note 1, at 8. 
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a non-self-executing treaty, conversely, as a treaty that may not be 
enforced in the courts without prior legislative "implementation.”29 
  
Further, the “statutes” that Lempert cites are UN treaties by and large that are 
devoted to human rights issues, and that may or may not have been ratified under 
U.S. law, and thus, may or may not applicable as U.S. law. Even if these treaties 
have been properly ratified (which Lempert does not specify), such legal 
instruments may be considered to have the legal force of “statutes” only from the 
vantage point of U.S. law. By failing to make this critical distinction at the outset, 
Lempert’s writing seems both confused and confusing. Moreover, his discussion 
does not address the adoption (and enforcement) of such conventions and other 
treaties by other countries. 
In addition, the “outline” of his “treatise” is just that: an outline, literally!30  
Clearly, this does not meet the requirements of being a “legal treatise,” despite 
Lempert’s bombastic, self-serving claims otherwise.  
But what really caught my attention is his section on the “Legal Enforcement 
of International Development Interventions, International and Domestic.”  He 
seems to lay out a confused thesis that insofar as: 
 
International law and mechanisms theoretically offer justification 
for enforcement of the elements of international development law 
that could hold high officials today of most major governments and 
international institutions, including the major development banks 
and multi-lateral organizations like the United Nations and its 
agencies, subject to criminal prosecution for interventions in 
development that in fact promote hidden agendas that undermine 
cultural viability (in criminal violation of the Genocide Convention) 
and that act to impoverish certain groups in ways that undermine 
their resources, stability, and livelihoods while knowingly 
benefitting [sic] other groups in ways that are “crimes against 
humanity.”  (Emphasis supplied.)31  
 
Lempert further claims that, “[t]he Rome Statute establishes four international 
crimes, two of which are at the basis of international development law: the crime 
 
29 Carlos Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 695 
(1995); see generally John Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy 
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 326-327 (1992). 
30 Compare Lempert, supra note 1, at 9-28, with IDL 1st ed., supra note 13, at 75-148, and IDL 2d. 
ed., supra note 8, at 71-119. 
31 Lempert, supra note 1, at 28. 
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of genocide and crimes against humanity.” 32  (Footnote eliminated.) Thus, 
concluding that “[a]ny violations of cultural sovereignty and sustainability would 
potentially be criminally enforceable under [the Genocide Convention].”33  
Frankly, I am nonplussed by this idea.  First of all, the nature of development, 
if anything, is a question of civil, not criminal law.  The leap of logic in holding 
officials of international development banks, and multilateral institutions such as 
the UN for genocide and crimes against humanity for any perceived failures in 
development does strain credulity. 
In my own writings, I avoided the idea of criminality in the development 
process, until I was not able to avoid it any longer.  During my last few years of 
teaching at Georgetown Law, I began to explore the idea of the failed state, and its 
consequences.  Of course, the idea of the “failure of the state” as a pillar 
supporting any discussion of international development law was clearly laid out in 
IDL 1st ed.34  However, I could no longer ignore the failure in development that 
was caused by failed states such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Libya and 
Yemen.   
A collapsed state that was unable (or unwilling) to police its borders often lead 
to the emergence of ungoverned or ungovernable territories. This, in turn, helps to 
create a welcoming environment for the illegal transit of goods and persons, and 
for corruption in general. In the final analysis, it may create a vicious circle of 
failed and failing states, and a platform for transnational organized crime, 
international terrorism, and corruption.  
My friend, Colonel Zachary Kinney,35 was instrumental in this regard. He 
invited me to teach with him at the International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA) in Roswell, New Mexico, which is a program run by the U.S. Department 
of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.  He 
encouraged me to scrutinize the failure of the state through the lens of the criminal 
activities that follow (and are encouraged by) such a collapse. As a result, the 
tripartite analysis of transnational organized crime, international terrorism 
(particularly Islamic-based terrorism), and endemic corruption within and without 
the collapsed state (by host government officials, private banks, and even 
multilateral institutions) came into clear focus for me, and for the participants in 
the ILEA courses where I taught. 
Indeed, this was exactly what my Fulbright seminar in Poland discussed.  
However, I had not included all of this academic work in the first edition of IDL.  
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 29. 
34 IDL 1st ed., supra note 13, at 15-22. 
35 See supra note 6. 
14
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol14/iss1/6
 
This was corrected when I published IDL 2d edition in 2020 which now includes a 
new, previously unpublished chapter on “Corruption and Its Consequences.” 
So, while I can appreciate Lempert’s desire to explore criminal facets of the 
development process, I again find his analysis to be confused and confusing.  I 
certainly had no wish to describe my own journey to the making of IDL (in all its 
iterations) here, but I felt that Lempert’s aspersions against me both as a legal 
scholar and practicing lawyer cannot be ignored. To the extent that I have cited 
my own works, it is in refutation to Lempert’s claims, and so I hope that you as 
the reader will indulge me.  It is not my intent to be “self-referential” as well! 
In conclusion, if Lempert decides to undertake another academic venture, I 




I have duly noted that there have been two cross-currents in reviews of IDL 1st 
edition, and in the peer review process leading to the publication of IDL 2d ed. To 
wit: first, that IDL should be viewed as “international financial law,” and the 
second, that IDL should contain (and discuss) all law subjects subsumed beneath 
its banner.  The first has been exhaustively dealt with above, and this mistake in 
my view has been made as a result of the way in which IDL has, on occasion, 
been interpreted by its readers.  But IDL is not what it may appear to be at first 
glance.  (And I do mean “glance.”) 
The second requires a discussion of all aspects of IDL in one setting.  Not only 
would result in an encyclopedic “theory of everything,” it far surpasses my ability 
to comment on every possible dimension of IDL!  
In fact, IDL 1st ed., recognized this possibility and specifically stated that, 
“[the text] is not intended to be used as a primer for international business 
transactions. Nor is this text intended to be a restatement of black letter law on 
subjects such as bankruptcy law, secured transactions, or intellectual property law, 
as such subjects might affect relations between the developed and the developing 
world. More importantly, trade issues, while critical to the international 
development process, have not been addressed since those debates are so 
abundantly addressed elsewhere.”36 
In recognition of these two issues in viewing IDL (both editions), I have 
published a section in the second edition that expands and clarifies the parameters 
of IDL.  I reproduce it here with the kind permission of the Editors of this 
distinguished law journal.  
 
 
36 IDL 1st ed., supra note 13, at xiv. 
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“WHAT THE TEXT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT37 
 
In light of the fact that the queries posed by the subject of international 
development law are broad and ambitious, it would be remiss on my part not to 
advise the reader of the limitations of this text. This text examines the relationship 
of certain legal, historical, and philosophic ideas to one another within the context 
of the international development process. It is not intended to be used as a primer 
for international business transactions. Nor is this text intended to be a restatement 
of black letter law on subjects such as bankruptcy law, secured transactions, 
environmental law, or intellectual property law for example, as such subjects 
might affect legal relations between the developed and the developing world. This 
text is being proffered in hopes that it may provide an overview of the legal, 
philosophical, and financial underpinnings of international development going 
forward. 
Therefore, in setting the general parameters of the discussion below, let me 
make some important clarifications at the start. First, “international development 
law” (IDL) itself fits under the general banner of “international law.” However, it 
should not automatically be classified under the subject of “international finance 
law” or under “international economic law.” I realize that this will be a temptation 
because of the way that the text is written; however, that is not my intent. 
Moreover, please bear in mind that “international development” actually means 
“sustainable international development.” 
Second, I specifically chose to discuss the methods and implications of 
“financing” international development for the focus of the text. Not only do I feel 
that I may have something substantive to offer in this discussion, but financing 
development is in my view also the logical starting point for embarking on any 
concerted effort to encourage or facilitate “international development.” 
By this, I simply mean that whether the development project or focus is on 
maternal health, child survival and nutrition, species and habitat protection, fair 
trade or any number of issues, the financing of  development (both on a micro- 
and macroeconomic scale) is the means by which development goals may be 
achieved. I regret any confusion I may have created on this point based on my 
previous writings. I trust that this clarification here will be useful in going forward. 
(I also recognize that other approaches may be taken to the subject matter of 
international development law, but I sincerely hope that this starting point is a 
useful one, both as an academic and as a practical matter.) 
Third, while the text does address many topics related to international 
development, it is not intended to be the “theory of everything.” In other words, 
 
37 IDL 2d. ed., supra note 8, at xii-xiii. 
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IDL is not, and was never intended to be, a handbook on literally every subject 
related to international development. Not only will this surpass any expertise I 
may have to offer, but the text itself would become unwieldy and unusable. 
Accordingly, there are many important subjects that are not dealt with in any 
significant way, such as trade, immigration, environment, climate change, 
international arbitration, intellectual property rights, women’s rights, and 
international human rights. While these and many other subjects do fall under the 
rubric of IDL, they are not dealt with in detail in light of the fact that other texts, 
casebooks, and treatises dealing with these subjects, as written by subject matter 
experts, are widely found elsewhere. It is my hope that a focus here on financing 
international development is the logical starting point to which other academics 
and practitioners may add their own analysis on specific subject matters that are 
part of the IDL universe. 
More importantly, trade issues, while critical to the international development 
process, have not been addressed since those debates are so abundantly addressed 
elsewhere. Not only would it be redundant, but it would also be less ably 
discussed within this context. It is the hope of the author that professors who may 
wish to use the text will supplement it with trade discussions and other materials, 
as they may see fit. 
In addition, while the importance of dispute settlement mechanisms, especially 
those focused on international investment arbitration and related dispute 
resolution approaches, cannot be overestimated, a discussion of these approaches 
will also, regrettably, be omitted in order to lend more clarity and succinctness to 
this text. International arbitration and host government regulation of foreign 
investment are vast and detailed subjects of law and legal practice that deserve a 
more thorough treatment than may be offered in this more limited context that is 
clearly focused on the impact of global finance on the international development 
process in general. 
Finally, it is my hope that this work adds to the growing and fascinating legal 
discourse on international development generally which, in my view, is one of the 
most dynamic areas of international law at present. 
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